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PROTECTION OF INVENTIVE IDEAS THROUGH
POSTEMPLOYMENT ASSIGNMENT COVENANTS
The continued success of a manufacturing institution depends upon the
timely and expensive process of product improvement and invention which
usually requires employment of specialized personnel. However, some com-
panies have sought to "short cut"1 this process of development by hiring the
employees of competitors in order to acquire their knowledge of develop-
ments and research gained during former employment.' The law of trade
secrets, unfair competition and patents has attempted to protect businesses
from such practices, but interests in intangible ideas are difficult to describe
and protect.' As a result many businesses have resorted to contracts to pro-
tect these interests.
The inventor's ability to invent constitutes his primary means of employ-
ment. If he is obligated to assign future inventions in a specific field, his
technical mobility, source of income, and usefulness to society will be signi-
ficantly decreased. However, when an employee has received a portion of
his knowledge and ability from his employer for the benefit of the business,
the business organization has a legitimate interest in restricting the
use of this knowledge and ability. The extent of protection for these
interests should be determined by balancing the employer's and employee's
interests along with the public's interest in producing maximum inventive
development and ethical conduct. This note will analyze the need for and
capabilities of postemployment assignment covenants to protect business
interests in inventive ideas.
1. Bowen, Who Owns What's in Your Head?, Fortune, July 1964, p. 174; Smith,
Business Espionage, Fortune, May 1956, p. 118.
2. Smith, supra note 1, at 192.
3. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917); 2
CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 51.1, at 782-83 (2d ed. 1950)
[hereinafter cited as CALLMANN]; Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 4, 21
(1962); see ELLIs, TRADE SECRETS § 6 (1953) [hereinafter cited as ELLIS]; 1 NIMIs,
UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARs § 141, at 402-03 (1947) [hereinafter cited as
NIMS].
Difficulty in defining intangible ideas as protectible is perhaps best illustrated in the
law of trade secrets. Trade secrets are
a strange form of "property" that disappears when the information it embraces
becomes public or others independently make the same discovery, and the protect-
ability of which depends upon the circumstances of disclosure and use-as, for in-
stance, where an innocent person is permitted to use it without consent, but one
who violates a confidence is not. Stedman, supra.
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I. TRADE SECRETS
Some of the protection that is sought by the use of postemployment
covenants is achieved through the existing law of trade secrets. The qual-
ities that characterize trade secrets are confidential treatment of the infor-
mation by the business4 and employee knowledge of its confidential nature.'
The commonly used definition of a trade secret is "any formula, pattern,
device or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and
which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it."6 To qualify, the information must not be com-
4. Hahn & Clay v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 212 F. Supp. 22, 31 (S.D. Tex. 1962), afl'd,
320 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 944 (1963); Tom Lockerbie, Inc. v.
Fruhling, 207 F. Supp. 648, 656 (E.D. Wis. 1962); Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio De-
vices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250, 272 (S.D. Cal. 1958), aff'd mem., 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961); Newell v. 0. A. Newton & Son Co., 104 F.
Supp. 162, 166 (D. Del. 1952); Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279,
23 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1962) (action destroyed because product gave away secret) ; Schulen-
burg v. Signatrol Inc., 50 Ill. App. 2d 402, 200 N.E.2d 615 (1964); Space Aero Prods.
Co. v. R. E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74 (1965); Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v.
Bell-Mark Corp., 79 N.J. Super. 156, 191 A.2d 67 (Ch. 1963) (action destroyed because
product gave away secret); National Starch Prods., Inc. v. Ploymer Indus., Inc.,
273 App. Div. 732, 79 N.Y.S.2d 357, leave to appeal denied, 274 App. Div. 822, 81
N.Y.S.2d 278 (1948); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Rapp, 33 Misc. 2d 1011, 226 N.Y.S.2d 562
(Sup. Ct. 1962); B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 192 N.E.2d 99
(1963); 2 CALLMANN §§ 51.1, 53.1; ELLIS §§ 26, 53; 2 Nires §§ 141-42; Develop-
ments-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REv. 888, 949 (1964). The term confidential as
used in trade secret law is not equivalent to a confidential relationship as required in
other legal actions. 2 CALLMANN § 51.1, at 786. However, several recent decisions have
required a confidential relationship or a contract to transfer ownership of a trade secret
in an inventive idea to the employer. Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., supra; Spring
Steels, Inc. v. Molloy, 400 Pa. 354, 162 A.2d 370 (1960); Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa.
569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960).
"Intent to keep an idea or particular fact secret is the first requirement for protection."
2 CALLMANN § 53.1, at 803. This intent is not destroyed if the information was disclosed
only because of necessity, as to a supplier's salesman, and a substantial element of
secrecy is retained. Space Aero Prods. Co. v. R. E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d
74 (1965).
5. Newell v. 0. A. Newton & Son Co., supra note 4, at 167; Schulenburg v. Signatrol
Inc., supra note 4; Peerless Pattern Co. v. Pictorial Review Co., 147 App. Div. 715, 717,
132 N.Y. Supp. 37, 39 (1911); 1 Nims § 143(a) at 409; RESTATEMENT (SrcOND),
AGENCY § 396, comment c at 226 (1958); RESTATEMBENT, TORTS § 757, comment b
(1939); see Developments-Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. REv. 888, 949 (1964).
However, a recent case has held the inventor's knowledge of the value of his findings
does not fulfill the requirement of confidentiality. Wexler v. Greenberg, supra note 4, at
582, 160 A.2d at 436-37.
6. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 757, comment b (1939); accord, Space Aero Prods. Co. v.
R. E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74 (1965). Also, the product or device must
be "for continuous use in the operation of the business." RESTATEMIENT, TORTS § 757,
comment b (1939). (Emphasis added.)
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monly known,' and it must be a substantial advance over prior knowledge
in the field.' The idea need not be patentable,9 and if patented, it is no
longer a secret,"0 although other related information such as processes lead-
ing to manufacture may still remain trade secrets. 1
However, the law of trade secrets has several analytical difficulties that
prevent it from effectively resolving cases involving inventive ideas. Re-
covery for misappropriation requires the defendant to have had conscious
knowledge of the information's confidentiality.' But while an employee
7. American Potato Dryers, Inc. v. Peters, 184 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
34 U.S. 930 (1951); Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250
(S.D. Cal. 1958), aff'd mem., 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869
(1961) (process generally known); Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919
(D. Md. 1958); see Spring Steels, Inc. v. Molloy, 400 Pa. 354, 162 A.2d 370 (1960)
(methods developed by others and were available to any processor); RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 757, comment b (1939); Developments-Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. REV.
888, 949 (1964). But see Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 582, 160 A.2d 430, 436
(1960) (modifying formulas of others' products was not sufficient for recovery).
8. Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250, 272 (S.D. Cal.
1958), aff'd mem., 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961);
Newell v. 0. A. Newton & Son Co., 104 F. Supp. 162 (D. Del. 1952); ELLIS § 17; RE-
STATEMENT, TORTS § 757, comment b (1939); Developments-Competitive Torts, 77
HARV. L. REV. 888, 949 (1964). The Newell case illustrated the degree of novelty that
is required. "[A] trade secret to be protected, must contain some element of value or
usefulness, yet a trade secret need not contain such novelty as would make it patentable."
Newell v. 0. A. Newton & Son Co., supra at 165. (Emphasis added.)
9. Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 290, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198,
212 (1962); RESTATEMr,-NT, TORTS § 757, comment b (1939); accord, Newell v. 0. A.
Newton & Son Co., supra note 8, at 165; Wireless Specialty Apparatus Co. v. Mica Con-
denser Co., 239 Mass. 158, 131 N.E. 307 (1921); 2 CALLMANN § 52.1, at 797; ELIs §
17, at 35.
10. 2 CALLMANN §§ 51.1, at 784, 53.3(b), at 810; Stedman, supra note 3, at 15; see
Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250 (S.D. Cal. 1958), aff'd
mem., 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961); Goldin v. R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 22 F. Supp. 61, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
11. "[A] secret may coexist with the patent, notwithstanding the fact that the latter
had been fully published and disclosed." 2 CALLIMANN § 52.1, at 802; see Westcott
Chuck Co. v. Oneida Nat'l Chuck Co., 199 N.Y. 247, 92 N.E. 639 (1910), reversing
133 App. Div. 937, 118 N.Y. Supp. 1149 (1909); Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 23
N.E. 12 (1889).
12. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 757 (1939) states:
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to do so, is
liable to the other if
(a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or(b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by the
other in disclosing the secret to him, or
(c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of the facts that it was
a secret and that the third person discovered it by improper means or that the third
person's disclosure of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to the other, or(d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was a secret and that its
disclosure was made to him by mistake.
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may know that information is confidential and would understand that out-
right disclosure of a secret would be unlawful or improper, he might not be
aware that the mere use of confidential techniques or information in a new
employment, entered into in good faith with no intent to injure his previous
employer, might also be found improper and unlawful by a court." Also,
in some situations, inventors feel that they would have discovered
the same ideas independent of their employment and that, therefore, they
should ethically be able to use these ideas. However, this probability does
not exonerate an employee from a violation of trade secret law. 4 On the
other hand, by the use of postemployment covenants the precise obligations
and rights of an employee can be clarified and explicitly pointed out to him.
Ordinarily, trade secrets are transferred from the employer to the em-
ployee, but with inventions the opposite is often true. 5 If the ownership of
inventive ideas is not assumed by the court to belong to the business, diffi-
13. See E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 200
A.2d 428 (Del. Ch. 1964). The law is not clear as to what the obligation of the em-
ployee is when he switches employers. It has often been said that "equity has no power
to compel a man who changes employers to wipe clean the slate of his memory." Peer-
less Pattern Co. v. Pictorial Review Co., 147 App. Div. 715, 717, 132 N.Y. Supp. 37,
39 (1911); accord, Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250, 266
(S.D. Cal. 1958), aff'd mem., 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869
(1961); Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 288, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198,
210 (1962); Avocado Sales Co. v. Wyse, 122 Cal. App. 627, 634, 10 P.2d 485, 488
(1932). Also, in the bulk of these cases the principles of agency are of little help because
"the employee's conduct can rarely be characterized as 'unfair' or 'disloyal.' " Develop-
ments-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REv. 888, 951 (1964). However, in some
situations the employee ethically understands his wrongdoing, even though information
has not yet been disclosed. In B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493,
192 N.E.2d 99 (1963), the employee felt that "loyalty and ethics had their price; insofar
as he was concerned, . . . [his new employer] was paying the price." Id. at 498, 192
N.E.2d at 104; accord, Ferranti Elec., Inc. v. Harwood, 43 Misc. 2d 533, 251 N.Y.S.2d
612 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
14. Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919, 923 (D. Md. 1958); Schulen-
burg v. Signatrol Inc., 50 Ill. App. 2d 402, 200 N.E.2d 615 (1964). But see Sarkes
Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250 (S.D. Cal. 1958), aff'd mem.,
283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961) (employees not liable
for using generally known process of plaintiff); Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160
A.2d 430 (1960) (employee could use modifications of competitors' formulas made dur-
ing employment). Of course, if the secret becomes known to another individual through
his own efforts, such as through independent investigation, no action lies against him.
1 Nuus § 148, at 418; RESTATEMENT, ToRTS § 757, comment b (1939).
15. In Wexler v. Greenberg, supra note 14, at 577-78, 160 A.2d at 434, it was stated
that
the usual situation involving misappropriation of trade secrets in violation
of a confidential relationship is one in which an employer discloses to his employee
a pre-existing trade secret (one already developed or formulated) so that the em-
ployee may duly perform his work. In such a case, the trust and confidence upon
which legal relief is predicated stems from the instance of the employer's turning
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culty may arise in conceptualizing this transfer of ownership from the em-
ployee to the employer. In Wexler v. Greenburg,"6 the employer was not
able to prove ownership of an existing trade secret because the court re-
quired either a confidential relationship or a contract to transfer the owner-
ship of the trade secret from the employee to the employer. The court held
a confidential relationship did not exist because
it is conceptually impossible . . . to elicit an implied pledge of secrecy
from the sole act of an employee turning over to his employer
a trade secret which he, the employee, has developed, as occurred in
the present case, [and] the appellees must show a different manner in
which the present circumstances support the permanent cloak of con-
fidence .... The only avenue open to the appellees is to show that the
nature of the employment relationship itself gave rise to a duty of non-
disclosure. 7
Business ownership of patents also is determined by the employment re-
lationship. An express contract to invent or one implied from the function
or position of the employee is required to vest ownership of an invention in
the employer." However, these contracts have been narrowly construed so
that if a contract specifies that the employee is to design or construct, his
over to the employee the pre-existing trade secret. It is then that a pledge of se-
crecy is impliedly extracted from the employee, a pledge which he carries with him
even beyond the ties of his employment relationship. (Footnotes omitted.)
Accord. Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198
1962).
16. Supra note 14.
17. Id. at 578, 160 A.2d at 434.
18. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933); Solomons
v United States, 137 U.S. 342, 346 (1890); Fish v. Air-O-Fan Prods. Corp., 285 F.2d
208 (9th Cir. 1960); Blum v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 281, 289 (3d Cir. 1950); Mar-
shall v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 175 F.2d 213 (3d Cir. 1949); Houghton v. United
States, 23 F.2d 386, 390 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 592 (1928); Magnetic Mfg.
Co. v. Dings Magnetic Separator Co., 16 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 274
U.S. 740 (1927); Wireless Specialty Apparatus Co. v. Mica Condenser Corp., 239 Mass.
167, 131 N.E. 307 (1921); Davis v. Alwac Int'l, Inc., 369 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Civ. App.
1963); 2 CALLMIANN § 55.2(b) (2), at 829; 1 Nims § 151, at 427-28; Snelling, The
Rights of the Inventor-Employee, 22 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 410, 416-21 (1940); Note, 22
NOTRL DAME LAW. 429 (1947); Note, 7 PATENT, TRADEMARK, & COPYRIGHT J. OF
RESLARCH & EDUCATION 380, 382 (1963); Note, 11 RUTGERS L. REv. 468 (1956); see
American Stay Co. v. Delaney, 211 Mass. 229, 97 N.E. 911 (1912).
If one is employed to invent, the product of his work belongs to his employer, but if
one is a general employee, inventions are beyond the scope of employment and an em-
ployee will not be required to assign inventions to his employer. 2 CALL!6ANN §
55.2(b) (2), at 829-31. The contract can be express or implied, but in either case the
employee must be hired to invent. For example, in the Fish case, the court held the
contract was implied because the employee (vice-president) and others believed his reg-
ular duties included the design and development of machines, and also he had assigned
other "inventive contributions" to his employer. Fish v. Air-O-Fan Corp., supra at 210.
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inventions will not be the property of the employer." Furthermore, when
an employee is not hired to invent but does so with his master's facilities
during the hours of employment, the master acquires only a "shop right"
or license for the non-exclusive use of the invention." In the Wexler case
the court applied these principles to determine the ownership of a trade
secret; since the employee was merely hired to develop further the formulas
of competitive products and not to invent, the ownership of his modifica-
tions did not exclusively belong to the employer and protection of them
was denied.2
Another difficulty in protecting a trade secret is proving the time the in-
vention was created. Trade secret law does not recognize an interest in
inventions created after employment has terminated if the basic idea was not
19. "Employment to design or to construct or to devise methods of manufacture
is not the same as employment to invent" . . . . And, by the same token, a direc-
tion to an employee to develop an idea which he had already conceived on his own
is not a direction to invent and does not entitle the employer to the invention or
the patent on it.
Cahill v. Regan, 5 N.Y.2d 292, 297, 157 N.E.2d 505, 508, 184 N.Y.S.2d 348, 352
(1959), affirming 4 App. Div. 2d 328, 165 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1957); accord, United States
v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187-88 (1933); B.F. Gladding & Co. v. Scien-
tific Anglers, Inc., 248 F.2d 483, 484 (6th Cir. 1957); see Dazell v. Dueber Watch Case
Mfg. Co., 149 U.S. 315 (1893); 1 Niuts § 151, at 428-30.
20. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., supra note 19; Solomons v. United
States, 137 U.S. 342, 346 (1890); Standard Brands Inc. v. United States Partition &
Packaging Corp., 199 F. Supp. 161, 176 (E.D. Wis. 1961); Massie v. Fruit Growers'
Express Co., 31 F.2d 463 (D. Del. 1929), rev'd on other grounds, 41 F.2d 43 (3d Cir.
1930); Aero Bolt & Screw Co. v. Iaia, 180 Cal. App. 2d 728, 5 Cal. Rptr. 53 (1960);
Kinkade v. New York Shipbuilding Corp., 21 N.J. 362, 122 A.2d 360 (1956); Cahill v.
Regan, supra note 19; Cornell v. T.V. Dev. Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 628, 245 N.Y.S.2d 918
(Sup. Ct. 1954); Bishop, Employers, Employees, and Inventions, 31 So. CAL. L. Rv. 38
(1957); Morris, Patent Rights in an Employee's Invention: The American Shop Right
Rule and the English View, 75 L.Q. REv. 483 (1959); Snelling, supra note 18, at
424-27; Note, 7 PATENT, TRADEifARx, & COPYRIGHT J. OF RESEARCH & EDUCATION
380, 385-95 (1963); see American Stay Co. v. Delaney, 211 Mass. 229, 97 N.E. 911
(1912) (held president-inventor had right to use his inventions).
21. Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960). The court relied on
the fact that the defendant was not employed to create or invent and never had done so
while in the employ of the plaintiff. His routine job was to modify and change the for-
mulas of competitors' products. Id. at 582, 160 A.2d at 436; accord, Futurecraft Corp.
v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 283-88, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198, 208-10 (1962).
Therefore, a result was reached which is analogous to the solution in patent law cases
when company ownership of an invention is in issue. Patent law principles were also
used in determining the ownership of trade secrets in B.F. Gladding & Co. v. Scientific
Anglers, Inc., 248 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1957). The court stated that
the mere creation of an employer-employee relationship does not per se cause any
and all inventions, patents or trade secrets to belong to the employer. It must be
shown that under the particular employment contract that that which is being
claimed by the employer is the precise subject of the contract of employment such
as "for solving a defined problem" or to "evolve a process or mechanism for meet-
ing a specific need." Id. at 485.
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a trade secret of the business during employment. This is because the law
of trade secrets attempts only to protect information that has been given
confidential treatment by the business. Therefore, if an invention de-
veloped during employment was not disclosed to the employer, he must
prove that the idea was born during employment.
In successful trade secret cases, equity provides relief usually by enjoining
further utilization of another's trade secret, and awarding money damages
if there was previous injury.2 However, in the absence of a contract pro-
viding for specific assignment, courts are reluctant to force assignment of
inventions except in cases where this relief is clearly required, such as when
the invention has been conceived during employment.23
Trade secret law is burdened with difficult proof problems such as
proving the existence of the required elements of a trade secret,24 ownership
of the inventive idea 5 and use of the information." An employer may use
covenants to overcome these problems. Also, there are several barriers
to litigating possible violations of trade secret law such as the expense
of legally assessing every possible misappropriation, the contingency
that required evidence would publicly expose the secret 7 and the potential
22. ELLIS § 350, at 450.
23. Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Carter Prods., 230 F.2d 855, 865 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 352 U.S. 843 (1956) (court required assignment of patents on inventions discovered
during former employment); De Long Corp. v. Lucas, 176 F. Supp. 104, 134 (S.D.N.Y.
1959), af'd, 278 F.2d 804 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 833 (1960) (constructive
trust of patent applications resulting from confidential knowledge); Wireless Specialty
Apparatus Co. v. Mica Condenser Co., 239 Mass. 158, 166, 131 N.E. 307, 310 (1921)
(must assign inventions resulting from use of former employer's secrets). One reason
assignment as a remedy in trade secret cases is rare may be that usually the action is
quickly brought, before any additional invention can be developed.
24. See Tom Lockerbie, Inc. v. Fruhling, 207 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Wis. 1962);
Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250 (S.D. Cal. 1958), aff'd
mernm., 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961); Newell v.
0. A. Newton & Son Co., 104 F. Supp. 162 (D. Del. 1952) (secret disclosed by public
exhibition); Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198
(1962) (if product publishes secret, the action is destroyed); Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v.
Bell-Mark Corp., 79 N.J. Super. 156, 191 A.2d 67 (Ch. 1963) (secret made public by the
product) ; Welex Jet Servs., Inc. v. Owen, 325 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
25. See notes 15-21 supra and accompanying text.
26. See Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250 (S.D. Cal.
1958), aff'd mem., 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961)
(no use of secrets peculiarly belonging to plaintiff was proved); Welex Jet Servs., Inc.
v. Owen, 325 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (evidence was persuasive, but court
found no trade secrets used).
27 Where the burden is upon the plaintiff and confidential evidence is within its
control, it cannot avoid producing it merely because to do so would reveal its
secret.
The evidence revealing the secret information may, however, be given in camera
and the record may be sealed or otherwise protected from publication. Such a
disclosure is not a publication to the world. I Nixs § 147, at 415. (Footnotes
omitted.)
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damage to business relations that would result from preventing an employee
from obtaining other work and from publicly admitting that a competitor
has acquired valuable knowledge. However, by the use of a covenant the
employer may be able to mitigate some of these difficulties.
These problems have not been solved, and the standards for relief have
not been liberalized because the law of trade secrets must resolve not only
situations involving inventive ideas but also a variety of other types of
trade secret misappropriations. Stringent requirements are presently placed
on the confidential treatment of the information to insure that the employee
consciously understands its nature. If the standards of confidentiality were
lowered, employers might be able to choose the interests to be protected
after the employee has obtained new employment. Novelty must also be
shown to assure that the information does have a value to the business.
Finally, the information must not be generally known in order to eliminate
any possibility that the employee acquired the information from another
source. These requirements afford built-in protection for the employee and
the public as well as for the employer.
II. COVENANTS
Businesses seeking to restrict the use of inventive ideas have not relied
solely on trade secret relief but have supplemented their protection by the
use of contracts and patents. Many employers favor patenting because the
right to exclusive use for a period of years is retained and a special judicial
procedure has been established for the enforcement of patent rights, but
patenting may be disadvantageous to the business because no protection is
given the idea except that the use of the product is exclusively given to the
business for a period of years. The obvious advantage of using contracts
rather than relying on trade secret relief is that proof of a breach of contract
is substituted for proof of each requirement of trade secret law. The ques-
tion is no longer whether a trade secret has been misappropriated but
whether the defense of restraint of trade will prevent enforcement of the
contract that has been breached. Therefore, although it is not required,"
the subject matter of many covenants involving inventors is limited to trade
secrets. 9
There are several possible intentions that a business may have in pro-
28. See 2 CALLMANX § 55.2(b), at 827; Developments-Competltive Torts, 77
HARv. L. REV. 888, 948 (1964).
29. Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 HAftv. L. REV. 625, 669 n.146
(1960); see Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960).
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posing an agreement to an employee. The employer may be attempting to
establish the existence of the necessary requirements for obtaining trade
secret relief." Thus, a contract can partially fulfill trade secret requirements
by providing evidence that the employee has been warned that he will
acquire trade secret information and by describing, if possible,"' the nature
of this information. Also, the employer may intend to clarify the ethical
obligations of the employee under trade secret law in order to eliminate
future misunderstandings if he changes employers. Furthermore, contracts
may establish employer ownership of trade secrets conceived by inventors
during employment, thus avoiding the problem of transference of the
secret. Contracts may also be used to expand the subject matter pro-
tected or the relief given beyond existing trade secret law. " Public policy
prevents enforcement of unreasonable contracts, but the extent covenants
can be used to encompass more than trade secret law and still not be un-
reasonable is unclear.
I1. ENFORCEMENT OF COVENANTS ASSIGNING IMPROVEMENTS
The scales of reasonableness seem to balance differently depending on
whether an invention or merely an improvement on a basic invention is
contested." Although "improvement" is a nebulous concept, it usually must
relate to a specific prior innovation so that the basic invention retains its
identity"' and must be valuable only when used in conjunction with that
prior invention." Courts have enforced agreements to assign postemploy-
ment improvements on inventions developed during prior employment even
30. There are two types of contractual provision: Those which interpret or clarify
rights and duties arising out of actual situations, and those which are designed to
create new rights and duties .... Where trade secrets are normally protected in
a particular jurisdiction, . . . the duties such provisions establish are implied.
The contract only "strengthens" the right to relief. 2 CALLMANN § 51.4, at 791.
(Footnotes omitted.)
31. Blake, supra note 29, at 669.
32. "Those agreements whereby one who is ordinarily free to compete limits his right
to do so,. .. are designed to and do create new rights and duties." 2 CALLMANN § 51.4,
at 792.
33. In many covenants, the language provides for the assignment of postemployment
"inventions and improvements." Although many definitions may be given to the term
"invention," it will be restricted in this discussion to a "basic" invention, which has value
in itself.
34. American Cone & Wafer Co. v. Consolidated Wafer Co., 247 Fed. 335, 336 (2d
Cir. 1917).
35. Tempco Elec. Motor Co. v. Apco Mfg. Co., 275 U.S. 319 (1928); West Dis-
infecting Co. v. United States Paper Mills, Inc., 44 F.2d 803 (3d Cir. 1930), cert. de-
nied, 283 U.S. 836 (1931) (improvements had to be attached to folding machine).
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if the covenants are unlimited in duration." By limiting the subject matter
of the agreement to an addition or change on a prior invention," the em-
ployer's interest overshadows any unfavorable effect that the covenant might
have on the employee or the public.
In Hulse v. Bonsack Mack. Co.,"5 the company patented machines for
the manufacture of cigarettes and employed Hulse to make improvements
on these machines. The employer used a postemployment assignment cove-
nant to preserve his investment by restraining Hulse from inventing an im-
provement for a third party after the termination of his employment. The
court, in upholding the covenant, found the covenant reasonable even
though its duration was unlimited. Since the covenant was limited to only
future improvements on inventions already owned, the court reasoned that it
did not restrict the employee's future career except for improving the orig-
inal invention. The Hulse case represents a logical extension of trade secret
protection through the use of covenants. A covenant was utilized to obtain
assignment of an improvement for a patented invention."
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF COVENANTS FOR ASSIGNMENT OF BASIC
INVENTIONS
When a postemployment assignment covenant is to be enforced, courts
apply a two step analysis. They determine (1) whether the invention falls
within the terms of the covenant and, (2) if it does, whether the covenant
is reasonable. Often, cases have not expressly dealt with the second question
but have considered only whether the invention falls within the terms of the
covenant. However, underlying these decisions are considerations of the
covenant's impact on the interests of the employer, the employee and the
public, which concern the reasonableness of the covenant, but not the cover-
age of its terms.
36. West Disinfecting Co. v. United States Paper Mills, Inc., supra note 35 (although
contract's duration was unlimited, improvement developed while in employment);
Chadeloid Chem. Co. v. H. B. Chalmers Co., 243 Fed. 606 (2d Cir. 1917) (invention
in issue had been held to infringe former employer's patent); Reece Folding Mach.
Co. v. Fenwick, 140 Fed. 287 (1st Cir. 1905); Hulse v. Bonsack Mach. Co., 65 Fed.
864 (4th Cir. 1895); Westinghouse Air-Brake Co. v. Chicago Brake & Mfg. Co., 85
Fed. 786 (C.C.N.D. I1. 1898); McFarland v. Stanton Mfg. Co., 53 N.J. Eq. 649, 33 At.
962 (Ct. Err. & App. 1896); Allison Bros. Co. v. Allison, 70 Hun 27, 23 N.Y. Supp. 1065
(Sup. Ct. 1893), rev'd on other grounds, 144 N.Y. 21, 38 N.E. 956 (1894).
37. Westinghouse Air-Brake Co. v. Chicago Brake & Mfg. Co., supra note 36; Allison
Bros. Co. v. Allison, supra note 36; see West Disinfecting Co. v. United States Paper
Mills, Inc., supra note 35; McFarland v. Stanton Mfg. Co., supra note 36.
38. 65 Fed. 864 (4th Cir. 1895).
39. See 2 CALLMANN § 53.3(b), at 810-11; 1 Nims § 146, at 412; Stedman, supra
note 3, at 15; Developments-Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. REv. 888, 947 (1964).




In interpreting covenants, some courts have apparently applied the
reasonableness test at the construction stage and determined the outcome of
cases by interpreting provisions so that their effect would be reasonable or
by severing entire provisions which are so unreasonable that interpretation is
impossible. Thus, the inclusion or exclusion of the contested invention de-
pends upon the coverage of the contract as interpreted."
40. In construing postemployment covenants to make them reasonable, the court
may decide "that his [the employee's] activity would fall within the scope of a reasonable
prohibition .... [and] make use of the tool of severance, paring an unreasonable restraint
down to appropriate size and enforcing it." Blake, supra note 29, at 675. (Footnote
omitted.) For a discussion of the severance doctrine as applied to non-competitive
covenants see Blake, supra note 29, at 681-84; Note, 41 N.C.L. REv. 253 (1963).
When courts feel that to assign the contested invention would be unreasonable, their
opinions usually express the feeling that the result would be harsh on the employee, and
then they sever the provisions that would result in assignment. This avoidance of the
question of enforceability by excluding the invention in issue from assignment covenants
often results in strained construction of the language of the clause. In Standard Plunger
Elevator Co. v. Stokes, 212 Fed. 893 (2d Cir. 1914), the employee signed a contract
in September 1902 and entered into actual employment subsequent to that date. The
contract provided that "the employee . . . hereby grants to the said corporation the ex-
clusive license to use all other future patents and inventions devised or acquired by him
with relation to elevators and their appliances." Id. at 896. (Emphasis added.) The
court rejected the plaintiff's interpretation that the provision required assignment of all
other future inventions, including those
the first conception of which came to Larson [the employee] only after his employ-
ment had ceased . . . [because] as thus construed, the clause would be an ex-
tremely harsh one; it might even be found unconscionable, for it mortgages his
inventive faculties to complainant for an indefinite period subsequent to employ-
ment, in relation not only to elevators of the "plunger" type, but to steam and
electric elevators as well. So harsh a construction should not be given to the con-
tract, unless its language precludes any more reasonable construction. Ibid.
The court held that the provision applied only to the time period between the execution
of the contract and the time when employment began. According to the court, the
contract had in other clauses provided for assignment of inventions created before
execution and during employment, and the intervening time gap was thought to be the
only period which the parties could have intended to cover.
Similarly, in Thibodeau v. Hildreth, 124 Fed. 892 (1st Cir. 1903), the employee
agreed to give to his employer "the full benefit and enjoyment of any and all inventions
or improvements which I have made or may hereafter make relating to machines or
devices pertaining to said Hildreth's [the employer's] business." Id. at 893. (Emphasis
added.) In order that the effect upon the employee not be unconscionable, the court
held that the terms included only inventions made while actually employed.
Gas Tool Patents Corp. v. Mould, 133 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1943) concerned the out-
right sale of patents, but the court expressly applied the considerations which it said
would control in an employment covenant situation. Id. at 818. The defendant and
other parties created the plaintiff corporation of which the defendant was made the
president and agreed to assign to it "any invention or improvement that they or any of
them may make in the future relating . . . " to the Saunders gas hammer. Id. at 816.
The defendant later terminated employment, and he subsequently invented a new gas
hammer-a pressure riveter. The court indicated that the adverse effect of requiring
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An example of severance is found in Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co." A contract was entered into by the company and the inventor provid-
ing for the assignment of any invention which the inventor might make at
any time which related to "abrasives, adhesives or related materials, or to
any business in which said company . . .may be concerned."2 First, the
court decided that several of the clauses were unreasonable, especially those
providing for unlimited subject matter and duration, and then found that
the inventions which were the subject matter of the litigation "fell within
the valid provisions of the agreement."4
A possible explanation for courts severing or interpreting in this manner
is that they presume the parties did not intend to make an unreasonably
broad covenant, and therefore, a narrow construction effectuates the
intentions of the parties in lieu of upsetting contractual expectations which
would result from holding the covenant unreasonable.4 However, correc-
tion of unreasonable covenants may allow employers to exact broad, com-
prehensive assignment contracts, thus coercing employees who generally
obey contractual obligations to submit to restrictions which no court would
assignment of postemployment inventions would be too great upon ex-employces, and
without invalidating the covenant, the court narrowly construed it holding that although
the new invention was a gas hammer, it was different from and did not relate to the
Saunders patent.
In National Cash Register Co. v. Remington Arms Co., 122 Misc. 234, 202 N.Y.
Supp. 691 (Sup. Ct. 1924), the inventor-employee signed a one year contract in 1909
which included a covenant to assign inventions created within "one year following such
termination of employment." Id. at 235, 202 N.Y. Supp. at 693. In 1910, the employee
was given no new contract but continued to work until 1917. Within the year follow-
ing actual termination of employment, he perfected the invention of a new cash register
for the defendant, his new employer, who had knowledge of the prior contract. The
trial court required assignment of the invention, after holding that the contract did not
have an unconscionable effect on the employee or the defendant. The appellate division
reversed, and after considering the "drastic" and possibly "harsh and inequitable" effect
upon the defendant, held that the terms of the covenant applied only to termination of
the original contract. National Cash Register Co. v. Remington Arms Co., 212 App.
Div. 343, 209 N.Y. Supp. 40 (1925), aff'd, 242 N.Y. 99, 151 N.E. 144 (1926).
However, severance has also been used to limit the effect of broadly drafted covenants
while still allowing the contested invention to remain within the protected provisions of
the contract. In Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1934),
cert. denied, 294 U.S. 711 (1935), the doctrine of severance was applied although the
court was not convinced that the employee was the inventor.
41. Supra note 40.
42. Id. at 387.
43. Id. at 389.
44. See, e.g., National Cash Register Co. v. Remington Arms Co., 212 App. Div. 343,
209 N.Y. Supp. 40 (1925), aff'd, 242 N.Y. 99, 151 N.E. 144 (1926), reversing 122
Misc. 234, 202 N.Y. Supp. 691 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
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enforce." Also, uncertainty in the enforceability of broadly drafted cove-
nants results in uncertainty of ownership of inventions and consequently
may hinder their marketability.
B. Application of Reasonableness Tests
Because of the dearth of cases involving postemployment assignment
covenants that have reached the issue of reasonableness, it is necessary to
draw upon the limitations that the restraint of trade tests have imposed
upon postemployment restrictive covenants.46 Although assignment cove-
nants attempt to protect the value of inventive ideas while restrictive cove-
nants may protect broader interests such as damaging competition, they both
affect the employee by foreclosing him from certain types of employment.
Therefore, it seems logical that the same limitations would be imposed upon
both types of covenants.
After a covenant has been interpreted, it will be enforced only if the in-
terests protected are reasonably necessary to the business, the restrictions on
the employee's mobility are reasonable, and the overall effect of the cove-
nant is not unreasonably injurious to the public interest." Reasonableness of
the restraint to each class of interest is tested by three factors-the scope of
the subject matter, the duration and the geographic area.4" After a court
45. For every covenant that finds its way to court, there are thousands which exer-
cise an in terrorem effect on employees who respect their contractual obligations
and on competitors who fear legal complications if they employ a covenantor, or
who are anxious to maintain gentlemanly relations with their competitors.
Blake, supra note 29, at 682; see Hudson Foam Latex Prods., Inc. v. Aiken, 82 N.J.
Super. 508, 516-17, 198 A.2d 136, 141 (App. Div. 1964); Note, 5 DuKE L.J. 115,
119-22 (1936); Note, 45 HARv. L. REv. 751 (1932).
46. Postemployment restrictive covenants are agreements not to compete with a for-
mer employer after employment has terminated. These covenants typically provide "that
the employee shall not work for a competitor or set up a competitive business for him-
self for a specified period of time in a designated geographical area." Blake, supra note
29, at 626. Blake further divides these covenants into two classifications of interests that
are protectible by the employer-"Customer Relationships" and "Confidential Business
Information." Blake, supra note 29. We are primarily concerned with the latter, since
covenants requiring assignment are primarily to protect inventive ideas.
47. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 515 (1932); Blake, supra note 29, at 646-51;
Carpenter, Validity of Contracts Not To Compete, 76 U. PA. L. Rav. 244 (1928);
Kales, Contracts To Refrain From Doing Business or From Entering or Carrying on an
Occupation, 31 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1917); Comment, 7 ARx. L. Rav. 35 (1953);
Note, 16 W. RES. L. Rav. 161 (1964). See generally Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 94 (1955);
Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 15 (1955).
Many states have enacted legislation controlling the use of covenants in restraint of
trade. However, most of these statutes have been construed to permit the type of cov-
enant discussed in this note, if reasonable. Blake, supra note 29, at 648-49 n.78.
48. E.g., Chemical Fireproofing Corp. v. Krouse, 155 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1946);
Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 32-41, 105 N.E.2d
685, 695-701 (C.P. 1952); Blake, supra note 29, at 674-81. In the Arthur Murray case,
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finds that the effect of the restriction is not patently unreasonable to each
class of interest, the entire covenant is considered, and the effect on these
interests is balanced to see "if, taken as a whole, its dimensions are pro-
portioned in relation to each other so as to keep the burden on the employee
down to the minimum consistent with reasonable protection to the em-
ployer's legitimate interests."4
1. Subject Matter
a. interest of the employer. The subject matter of the covenant must not
exceed the employer's reasonable needs for adequate protection of his com-
petitive position. 0 With regard to the inventor, only the protection of con-
fidential business information is recognized as necessary by the courts,"1 and
for this reason, any restriction must be limited to the specific subject matter
within the employee's access, especially if the business is highly diversified. 2
Although the limits of reasonableness are uncertain, there are several sit-
uations in which it is clear that courts will not enforce covenants. In the
absence of any other interest which is protectible, a covenant will not be
enforced if its purpose is solely to retain the services of the employee,"' to
the court listed possible considerations in determination of reasonableness to the three
interests.
49. Blake, supra note 29, at 675.
50. ELLIS § 99; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 516, comment h (1932); Blake, supra
note 29, at 648-49, 675.
51. Several cases and authorities have implied that covenants seeking to protect ideas
must protect only trade secrets of the business or have used the terms "trade secret" and
"confidential business information" interchangeably. Hydraulic Press Mfg. Co. v. Lake
Erie Eng'r Corp., 132 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1942) (implies that only trade secrets could
be protected); Club Aluminum Co. v. Young, 263 Mass. 223, 160 N.E. 804 (1928);
Blake, supra note 29, at 653; Comment, 25 YALE L.J. 499 (1916). However, the courts
do not look to trade secret law to determine the enforceability of covenants but rely on
the restraint of trade tests. E.g., Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 385,
389 (7th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 711 (1935); Universal Winding Co. v.
Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329 (D. Conn. 1952); Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter,
62 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 105 N.E.2d 685 (C.P. 1952) (extensive treatment given to both
customer relationships and confidential information). These tests require that the cov-
enant protect no more than is reasonable. Courts usually attempt to find value in the
information. To have value, the information must be specialized to the use of that busi-
ness and not be in general use by the business' competitors. Gas Tool Patents Corp. v.
Mould, 133 F.2d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 1943); Blake, supra note 29, at 651-53. Therefore,
the information to be protectible must be confidential but not in the strict trade secret
sense.
52. Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., supra note 51. However, the court may
avoid holding the entire covenant unenforceable by severing the unreasonable provisions.
For a full discussion see notes 40-45 supra and accompanying text.
53. Sprague Elec. Co. v. Cornell-Dubilier Elec. Corp., 62 F. Supp. 1, 5-6 (D. Del.
1945); Clark Paper & Mfg. Co. v. Stenacher, 236 N.Y. 312, 319-22, 140 N.E. 708,
711-12 (1923); Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17,
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remove the possibility that he will compete,54 or to prevent the employee
from using the general skill and experience he has acquired from his em-
ployment or previous career.5
However, the courts look only to the subject matter that the covenant
allegedly protects and, therefore, may not be considering the legitimacy of
the intentions that motivated an employer to extend his protection beyond
that existing without a contract, i.e., under trade secret law."6 The employer
may be attempting to prevent an employee from withholding an idea dur-
ing employment and then selling it to a competitor after termination. Also,
since inventing is usually a lengthy process, the employee's work may not be
culminated at the time employment ceases, and the business may wish to
prevent the employee's research from aiding a competitor.
A major difficulty in establishing a definable category of protectible
subject matter is that inventors use their prior experiences in the process
of invention all through their careers.5" Courts have recognized
the value in this knowledge and have granted protection to prevent the
33, 105 N.E.2d 685, 696 (C.P. 1952); see Heflebower v. Sand, 71 F. Supp. 607, 613 (D.
Minn. 1947); Sternberg v. O'Brien, 48 N.J. Eq. 370, 373, 22 At. 348, 349 (Ch. 1891).
54. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 283 (6th Cir. 1898),
modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); Heflebower v. Sand, supra note 53; Sprague Elec.
Co. v. Cornell-Dubilier Elec. Corp., supra note 53; Clark Paper & Mfg. Co. v. Stenacher,
supra note 53; Murray v. Cooper, 268 App. Div. 411, 51 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1944), af'd,
294 N.Y. 658, 60 N.E.2d 387 (1945); Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter,
supra note 53, at 33-34, 105 N.E.2d at 695-96; 6A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1394, at 100
(1962); Blake, supra note 29, at 652 & n.85.
55. Sprague Elec. Co. v. Cornell-Dubilier Elec. Corp., supra note 53 (foreman in
manufacturing department); Fortna v. Martin, 158 Cal. App. 2d 634, 639-40, 323
P.2d 146, 149 (1958) (termite control inspector); Mutual Loan Co. v. Pierce, 245
Iowa 1051, 65 N.W.2d 405 (1954) (employee of small loan company); Roy v. Bolduc,
140 Me. 103, 107, 34 A.2d 479, 481 (1943) (real estate salesman) ; Abramson v. Black-
man, 340 Mass. 714, 166 N.E.2d 729 (1960) (employee of real estate firm); Club
Aluminum Co. v. Young, 263 Mass. 223, 226-27, 160 N.E. 804, 806 (1928) (salesman);
Dunfey Realty Co. v. Enwright, 101 N.H. 195, 199, 138 A.2d 80, 83 (1957) (employee
of real estate firm); Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, supra note 53 (dancing
instructor); Welex Jet Seris., Inc. v. Owen, 325 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959)
(technical employees of oil well service company); Ridley v. Krout, 63 Wyo. 252, 272-74,
180 P.2d 124, 130-31 (1947) (bicycle repair man); Herbert Morris, Ltd. v. Saxelby,
[1916 1 A.C. 688, 714 (engineer); 6A CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 54, § 1394, at 99-
100; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1652, at 4648 (rev. ed. 1937); RESTATEMIENT (SEC-
OND), AGENCY § 396, comment h (1958); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 516, comment
f (1932); Blake, supra note 29, at 652. See generally Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 15, 122-24
(1955).
56. But see Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329 (D. Conn. 1952).
57. See Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, supra note 56, at 333; Westinghouse Air-
Brake Co. v. Chicago Brake & Mfg. Co., 85 Fed. 786, 792-96 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1898);
Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, L.R. 19 Eq. 462, 464 (1875).
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use of skill and experience which is specialized and not general. General
skills and confidential business information are usually difficult to separate
in the inventor's situation 8 because skill and experience that is specialized
in a certain area of products may also be a general method used by most
inventors. Thus, the prohibition against restricting the use of general skill
and experience by the employee begs the question of the degree of speciali-
zation needed for information to be worthy of confidential treatment. Rather
than define these terms, courts determine whether the subject matter to be
protected is reasonable by considering such factors as the nature of the com-
petition, the specialization of the business, the expense of development, the
inability to obtain protection by patents and the information made avail-
able to the employees. 9 General and special skills and experience are
usually mixed in the conglomerate fund of information which the business
attempts to protect," and the result of a case may be determined by the type
of skill and experience the court examines more closely.6 '
The inventor's unique employment complicates the traditional analysis
because the employee produces confidential information which adds to his
skill and experience when he performs his function. Though an inventor
gains general experience and skill through his employment, he also gains
valuable information about the weaknesses and inapplicability of certain
methods that were tested. It is not clear whether this is protectible con-
fidential information or merely an unprotectible addition to the employee's
skill and experience. 2 Knowledge of the correct steps leading to an inven-
58. "No ready formula has been yet devised by which general and special knowledge
can be clearly differentiated, and by which the manner and type of information an em-
ployee may use can be determined .... ." 2 CALLIANN § 55.2(a), at 824; accord, Blake,
supra note 29, at 653.
59. Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329, 333, 336-37 (D. Conn.
1952); Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 105 N.E.2d
685 (C.P. 1952) (many considerations listed).
60. Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, supra note 59; see Guth v. Minnesota Mining
& Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 711 (1935). Also in
cases not based on contract, general skill and experience have been enjoined along with
trade secrets but only because general skill and experience were incidental to the pro-
tection of the trade secrets. E.g., B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App.
493, 192 N.E.2d 99 (1963). However, in Universal Winding the specialized skill and
knowledge learned was deemed a protectible interest. Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke,
supra note 59, at 333.
61. See 2 CALLAIANN § 55.2 (discussion refers to trade secrets, but is applicable to
covenants).
62. It seems too general to say that he may use "the knowledge and acquain-
tance which he acquired in his former employment in his new employment"; and
the statement that "an employee, upon the severance of his employment, has the
unquestioned right of competition and the privilege of using any knowledge ac-
quired by him in the course of his employment so long as he is fair and does
not violate any confidence" simply begs the question ..... Since experience is
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tion seems worthy of confidential treatment because of its value in inventing
related products,63 although this knowledge is probably not protectible as a
trade secret."
A better approach may be to examine what information or processes the
inventor is using in his new employment, then determine whether a signi-
ficant portion of this skill and experience was derived from his previous
employment, and finally determine whether damage resulted to the
former employer. This analysis was adopted in Universal Winding Co. v.
Clarke," where a covenant to assign postemployment inventions afforded
something a man acquires, a standard must be found to test whether, in a par-
ticular case, an employee's experience is such as will permit of its use after termi-
nation of the employment, even though it may prove detrimental to his former
employer. 2 CALLMANN § 55.2(a), at 824-25. (Footnotes omitted.)
63. Houghton v. United States, 23 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S.
592 (1928); Westinghouse Air-Brake Co. v. Chicago Brake & Mfg. Co., 85 Fed. 786,
792-96 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1898); Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, L.R.
19 Eq. 462 (1875).
The methods of development and knowledge of the trial and error process of in-
vention has been recognized as deserving protection in Houghton v. United States, supra.
The court stated that, "when an employee merely does what he is hired to do, his suc-
cesses, as well as failures, belong to his employer." Id. at 390. Prior to that time Sir
G. Jessel had recognized such protection in Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v.
Sampson, supra.
Now nothing is better known than this, that when persons have turned their atten-
tion to a particular class of invention they are likely to go on and invent, and
likely to continuously improve the nature of their invention, and continuously to
discover new modes of attaining the end desired. Id. at 464.
Accord, Westinghouse Air-Brake Co. v. Chicago Brake & Mfg. Co., 85 Fed. 786, 792-
96 (C.C.N.D. III. 1898).
64. In several trade secret cases, courts have enjoined the employee from employ-
ment in certain fields to prevent disclosure of trade secrets. However, the protection
was not primarily for the use of the knowledge of the processes leading to invention.
E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428
(Del. Ch. 1964); Schulenburg v. Signatrol Inc., 50 Ill. App. 2d 402, 200 N.E.2d 615
(1964); B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 192 N.E.2d 99 (1963).
However, if only inventive knowledge was claimed as a trade secret there are several rea-
sons why it might not be protected. (1) The inventive process might be generally
known. (2) Since trade secrets are to protect advances over prior knowledge, the court
might not recognize the value of knowing prior failures in developing a product. See
notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text. (3) Even if a trade secret could be recognized,
it would be difficult to prove that the inventor actually used the same steps during
former employment. See Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250
(S.D. Cal. 1958), aff'd mem., 283 F.2d 695 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961);
Welex Jet Servs., Inc. v. Owens, 325 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). (4) The
court may find that the process has not become the property of the employer or that
the process is the general skill, knowledge, and experience of the employee. Wexler
v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960); 2 CALLMANN § 55.2(a). When the
end product has been patented and therefore the trade secret destroyed, the incidental
value of the knowledge of the process leading to invention, is also no longer protected
by trade secret law. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
65. 108 F. Supp. 329 (D. Conn. 1952).
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protection against the use of inventive experience and skill developed during
employment. The court reasoned that
it was necessary for the proper protection of plaintiff's competitive
position that a current knowledge of the plaintiff's great fund of
specialized information and accumulated experience in the field of
winding machinery should be made unavailable for the development
of designs inuring to the benefit of plaintiff's competitors."0
b. effect on the employee. If the covenant has an unduly restrictive effect
on the future activities of the employee, its enforcement would be unreason-
able." Postemployment assignment agreements "effectively close the doors
of employment""8 in competitive firms because potential employers will not
hire inventors having an obligation to assign their work product."0 In order
to allow other avenues of employment to the employee in related areas of
inventive work, the subject matter of the assignment covenant must be
restricted to the specific subject matter which the employee encountered
in his position"0 and must not include lines of business in which the employer
might potentially engage."
c. the public interest. The public interest dictates that investment in
research and development be encouraged and that the inventor be allowed
freedom to seek his best position. Therefore, the interest to be protected
and the injury to the employee should be reconsidered from the perspective
of the public interest." Of course, this examination is influenced by the
66. Id. at 333.
67. Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, supra note 65; see Guth v. Minnesota Min-
ing & Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 711 (1935);
Standard Plunger Elevator Co. v. Stokes, 212 Fed. 893 (2d Cir. 1914); National Cash
Register Co. v. Remington Arms Co., 212 App. Div. 343, 209 N.Y. Supp. 40 (1925),
aff'd, 242 N.Y. 99, 151 N.E. 144 (1926); Blake, supra note 29, at 676, 678 n.178.
68. Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., supra note 67, at 388; accord, Univer-
sal Winding Co. v. Clarke, supra note 65, at 332.
69. In Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, supra note 65, the court noted the restrictive
effect on the employee:
no competitor of the plaintiff [the former employer] in the field of winding ma-
chines would want to employ a designer who for the first year was under obli-
gation to disclose the fruit of his labor to ... [his former employer] and in effect
give the .. [former employer] a first option on any patentable rights .... Thus
in this aspect the agreement savored of a covenant for the year following em-
ployment by the plaintiff not to work, or not to accept employment, for one year
in the field of the design of winding machines. Id. at 332.
70. Gas Tool Patents Corp. v. Mould, 133 F.2d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 1943); see Uni-
versal Winding Co. v. Clarke, supra note 65.
71. Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1934), cart. denied,
294 U.S. 711 (1935); Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, supra note 65.
72. Blake, supra note 29, at 686. One situation in which the effect on the public
is a deciding factor occurs when the subject matter of the covenant is of an illegal
nature. In Lanteen Labs., Inc. v. Clark, 294 Ill. App. 81, 13 N.E.2d 678 (1938),
Clark was employed to develop a specialized type of contraceptive device. He agreed
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previous determination of the effect of the covenant on the other interests.
Another consideration may be avoiding monopolies or restraints on com-
petition.": Also, it is possible that urgently needed inventions such as
medical instruments, drugs, strategic defense materials, and components for
other publicly supported projects comprise an additional factor in the public
interest that may persuade the court to reach a decision fostering the fastest
and most inexpensive production.7 4
2. Duration
a. interest of the employer. Although agreements to assign inventions for an
unlimited duration after employment have been upheld,7" they are generally
invalid." Usually, the time restriction is not allowed to exceed the reason-
able needs of the employer in protecting his interests. Reasonable protec-
tion to business interests embraces the concept of "lead time,"7 which is
the time necessary for a business to make a head start in marketing and
further development. Lead time varies with the characteristics of the product
to assign to his employer all patent applications for these articles which would be filed
during and for five years after employment. After employment terminated, Clark in-
vented a new contraceptive and Lanteen filed suit for specific performance. At that
time, the sale of contraceptives was prohibited in Illinois, and the court held that the
contract was unenforceable. Id. at 91-93, 13 N.E.2d at 682.
73. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 515 (1932):
A restraint of trade is unreasonable, in the absence of statutory authorization
or dominant social or economic justification, if it
(c) tends to create, or has for its purpose to create, a monopoly, or to control
prices or to limit production artificially ....
Another consideration that may arise in future cases is that the effect of a covenant to
assign postemployment inventions may be contrary to the purposes of the patent laws
to encourage disclosure of inventive results, thereby bringing useful inventions into the
public domain quickly. Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.-Oct. 1963, p. 7.
74. Contra, De Long Corp. v. Lucas, 176 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd,
278 F.2d 804 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 833 (1960) (assignment granted
of patent involving construction of defense warning system); B. F. Goodrich Co. v.
Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 192 N.E.2d 99 (1963) (enjoined employment involv-
ing trade secrets on space suit construction).
75. Shur-Loc Elevator Safety Co. v. Purcell, 196 App. Di,. 546, 188 N.Y. Supp.
25 (1921), affirming mem. 185 App. Div. 888, 171 N.Y. Supp. 1099 (1918) (analysis
not made of reasonableness of time period) ; see Thibodeau v. Hildreth, 124 Fed. 892
(1st Cir. 1903) (agreement was upheld only as interpreted to include inventions dur-
ing employment).
76. E.g., Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1934), cert.
denied, 294 U.S. 711 (1935); Standard Plunger Elevator Co. v. Stokes, 212 Fed. 893,
896 (2d Cir. 1914).
77. Blake, supra note 29, at 677; see RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 515, comment c
(1932).
78. Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329, 333-34 (D. Conn. 1952);
Blake, supra note 29, at 670, 676, 678; see ELLIS § 106.
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and the marketing situation; for example, a product characterized by com-
plex production arrangements or infrequent replacement warrants extended
protection. 'In Universal Winding, the manufacture of winding machines
(complicated products which are seldom replaced) was involved, and a
one-year postemployment covenant was declared reasonable to protect the
employer's exploitation of his designs."
b. effect on the employee. Postemployment time restrictions must be reason-
able in their impact on the employee. If an employee received no
specialized knowledge because he had previous experience in the field,
any time restraint probably would be unreasonable."0 Also, in the balancing
process, the length of disablement must not be unreasonable in relation to
the value of the knowledge that the employee acquired. In Universal
Winding,8' the employee had no prior experience as a designer, and the
court upheld a covenant involving a one-year restriction. However, in
Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.,"' the worker, who was a chemical
engineer before employment, entered into a covenant that required assign-
ment of postemployment inventions for an unlimited time period. The
court severed all provisions of unlimited duration because the covenant as
written would have prevented the employee's future employment in the
chemical industry for life or would have donated "the children of his in-
ventive genius" to the former employer.8 3
c. the public interest. The public is interested in ultimate production of
inventive talent. This requires protection of both the employee's freedom
and the employer's continued investment in research. However, if con-
tinued employment in one positon is impossible, enforcement of a contract
which forever prevents an inventor from actively engaging in his most
knowledgeable field would stifle his utility to the public. Therefore, in Guth,
79. Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, supra note 78. The court stated:
to exploit these designs to its advantage, it was obviously necessary for the plain-
tiff to put them into actual production, to test them, and build up a market
for them before imitative competitors could begin that process of development.
For a task which thus involved the translation of a design in the blue-print stage
to an operable, tested machine in the hands of customers, it is reasonable to infer
that generally the plaintiff for its competitive needs would require at least a year's
time. Id. at 333.
However, this one-year period should not be considered as the maximum possible period
of protection because a longer length of time might have been held reasonable (1) if
litigated or (2) if the covenant had not included a broad provision that required assign-
ment of any invention developed in the field whether produced with the use of general
skills or specialized knowledge.
80. See 2 CALLMANN § 55.2(a) (refers to trade secrets, but applicable to covenants);
Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. Rxv. 625, 676 (1960).
81. Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329 (D. Conn. 1952).
82. 72 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 711 (1935).
83. Id. at 388.
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a covenant unlimited in duration that excluded the employee from a broad
area of the industry was held to be against the public interest."5 However,
the balancing process may allow a lengthy time restriction if the subject
matter of the covenant is strictly limited.8 To compromise these conflicting
interests, one solution may be to restrict an employee's mobility for only a
reasonable lead time, in this way protecting the employer long enough to
take advantage of his investment while not unreasonably affecting the future
of the employee."
3. Geographic Area
Geographic area usually can be eliminated as a factor in invention cases
because inventive ideas have transferable value,"7 and effective protection
of the employer's interest must include all available marketing areas. Cases
involving postemployment assignment covenants that have considered the
restraint of trade tests have not applied this factor.8" However, if a broad
restriction includes regions where a business cannot be damaged, a court
would probably consider the reasonableness of geographic restrictions.
CONCLUSION
Both postemployment assignment covenants and the legal safeguards
protecting trade secrets attempt to deter misappropriation of intangible busi-
ness interests that have novelty and confidentiality.s" However, the range of
84, Id. at 388-89.
85. Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329 (D. Conn. 1952).
86. Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, supra note 85, at 334; Blake, supra note 80,
at 678,
87. 1 Nxnts § 156, at 433-34; Blake, supra note 80, at 675, 679; see Vulcan Detin-
ning Co. v. American Can Co., 67 N.J. Eq. 243, 58 At. 290 (Ch. 1904).
88. Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1934), cert. denied,
294 U.S. 711 (1935) (factor recognized as a possible basis for severance); Universal
Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329 (D. Conn. 1952). But cf. Note, 81 L.Q. REv.
5, 6 (1965).
89. A trade secret must be a substantial advance over prior knowledge. Sarkes Tarzian,
Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250, 273 (S.D. Cal. 1958), aff'd mem., 283
F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961); Newell v. 0. A. Newton
& Son Co., 104 F. Supp. 162 (D. Del. 1952); Developments-Competitive Torts, 77
HARV. L. Rry. 888, 949 (1964); see Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430
(1960). It must also be confidential in two senses. (1) It must have been treated as con-
fidential by the employer, and it must not be generally known. Hahn & Clay v. A. 0.
Smith Corp., 212 F. Supp. 22, 31 (S.D. Tex. 1962), aff'd, 320 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 944 (1963); Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., vupra;
Newell v. 0. A. Newton & Son Co., supra; Schulenburg v. Signatrol Inc., 50 I1. App.
2d 402, 200 N.E.2d 615 (1964); Space Aero Prods. Co. v. R. E. Darling Co., 238 AMd.
93, 208 A.2d 74 (1965); National Starch Prods., Inc. v. Polymer Indus., Inc., 273
App. Div. 732, 79 N.Y.S.2d 357, motion for leave to appeal denied, 274 App. Div. 822,
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interests protectible by postemployment contracts is not limited to trade
secrets because the subject matter of a covenant is only required to be
reasonably necessary for the protection of the business. Although the range
of protectible interests is potentially greater, the employer might be afforded
less protection by the use of covenants than by relying on trade secret law
because enforcement of the former is limited by the reasonableness tests.
Proof of the contract and breach seem easier to establish than the require-
ments of a trade secret,"0 especially when a breach has clearly occurred, but
the restraint of trade tests may unexpectedly prevent enforcement. For ex-
81 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1948); B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 192
N.E.2d 99 (1963); 1 Nims § 142, at 407 (valuable only for continuance of secret); Do-
velopments-Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. REv. 888, 949 (1964); see 2 CALLMANN
§ 53.3, at 809; ELLS §§ 26, 53. (2) The receiver must have knowledge that the in-
formation was confidential. Schulenburg v. Signatrol Inc., supra; RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 757 (1939); see Space Aero Prods. Co. v. R. E. Darling Co., supra; Developments-
Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. REv. 888, 950 (1964).
In comparison, interests protectible by contract must also have value because of con-
fidentiality and novelty. (1) Confidentiality is required of the interest to be protected
by the restrictive covenant. Hydraulic Press Mfg. Co. v. Lake Erie Eng'r Corp., 132
F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1942); Mutual Loan Co. v. Pierce, 245 Iowa 1051, 65 N.W.2d
405 (1954); Abramson v. Blackman, 340 Mass. 714, 166 N.E.2d 729 (1960);
Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 105 N.E.2d 685
(C.P. 1952). However, the usage of the term is much broader in contract law than
in the law of trade secrets; see note 51 supra and accompanying text. (2) Novelty is
also required of the interest to be protected by a covenant. Kelite Corp. v. Khem
Chems., Inc., 162 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Ill. 1958); Harry Livingston, Inc. v. Macher,
30 Del. Ch. 94, 54 A.2d 169 (Ch. 1947); Roy v. Bolduc, 140 Me. 103, 34 A.2d 479
(1943); Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 235 N.Y. 1, 138 N.E. 485 (1923);
Molina v. Barany, 56 N.Y.S.2d 124, 130 (Sup. Ct. 1945). It is certain that the novelty
does not have to be in the trade secret sense, that is, previously unknown or narrowly
limited in use. Irvington Varnish & Insulator Co. v. Van Norde, 138 N.J. Eq. 99, 46
A.2d 201 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946). Blake has pointed this out as a fallacy but nonethe-
less it is existing law. Blake, supra note 80, at 673. In some cases, a considerable in-
vestment by the employer in time, effort and money seems to have satisfied the require-
ment for protection. Lee v. Samburn, 94 U.S.P.Q. 153, 154 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1952);
see Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Prods., Inc., 189 App. Div. 556, 179 N.Y.
Supp. 325 (1919).
Therefore, even though trade secrets and interests protectible by contract have dif-
ferent requirements as to degree, the characteristics of novelty and confidentiality can
be found in both. In fact, several cases have recognized the possibility of recovery on
covenant or trade secret alternatively. Hahn & Clay v. A. 0. Smith Corp., supra;
Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919 (D. Md. 1958); Securities Acceptance
Corp. v. Brown, 171 Neb. 701, 107 N.W.2d 540 (1961); Hudson Foam Latex Prods.,
Inc. v. Aiken, 82 N.J. Super. 508, 517, 198 A.2d 136, 141 (App. Div. 1964); B. F.
Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, supra (court noted that decision could have been based
on contract); Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, supra; Welex Jet Servs., Inc.
v. Owen, 325 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
90. For discussion of the proof problems in trade secret law see notes 24-26, 64
supra and accompanying text.
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ample, a contract designed to protect an interest for an unrestricted dura-
tion would be unenforceable because of the unreasonable effect on the em-
ployee,9 but the same interest considered as a trade secret would be pro-
tected for "the life of the secrecy.""2
There are three overriding problems in protecting inventive ideas through
the use of postemployment assignment covenants. The first problem is the
analysis that should be applied to covenants which attempt to protect sub-
ject matter that is actually a trade secret. The second is how far contracts
may extend protection without being unenforceable because of public
policy. The limitations will be determined by the restraint of trade tests,
which allow enforcement only if the provisions are reasonable. However,
the result is difficult to predict in advance of breach because the courts look
to the circumstances existing at the time of enforcement to determine the
reasonableness of the covenant's effect.9" The third problem is what, if any,
protection the courts should afford an employer if the effect of a covenant
overreaches the reasonableness tests and is therefore unenforceable.
In some situations it is probable that a covenant is employed to establish
the requirements of a trade secret or to avoid problems in the law of trade
secrets. In order to apply a test that is consistent with the purpose for which
the covenant was intended, the court could apply a two-step analysis in
which the subject matter is considered alternatively. (1) If the contested
invention would be protectible as a trade secret, then this approach would
apply trade secret requirements to postemployment covenants since these
covenants add nothing to the existing protection given by the law of trade
secrets." (2) If the subject matter is not a trade secret or the protection
sought is greater than that available under trade secret law, then the re-
straint of trade tests would be applied to determine the enforceability of the
contract.
When a covenant protects trade secret information and adds assignment
as the predetermined relief for misappropriation, it is possible to categorize
the covenant as merely duplicating trade secret law; but it can also be con-
91. For full discussion, see notes 80-83 supra and accompanying text.
92. 2 CALLMANN § 54.2, at 816. For a full discussion, see notes 4-11 supra and
accompanying text.
93. Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 39-40, 105
N.E.2d 685, 700 (O.P. 1952), lists many factors existing at the time of the trial which
may influence the decision of the court. See Blake, supra note 80, at 674. Contra, Slynn,
Restrictive Provisions In Contracts of Employment, 5 Bus. L. Rlv. 216, 217 (1958).
94. A covenant which protected secrets and provided for postemployment assign-
ment of inventions was at one time not subject to the restraint of trade analysis. Morse
Twist Drill & Mach. Co. v. Morse, 103 Mass. 73 (1869); accord, Hulse v. Bonsack
Mach. Co., 65 Fed. 864, 869 (4th Cir. 1895). But see Blake, supra note 80, at 669
n. 146.
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tended that assignment, which is merely specific performance, transforms
the action into one seeking enforcement of a contract, and therefore, the
reasonableness tests should apply."& However, in some trade secret cases
constructive trusts and other equitable devices have been granted to transfer
ownership of interests in ideas."0 Therefore, it seems that the contract should
be viewed as a prior agreement for the relief to be given if a misappropria-
tion of a trade secret occurs.9"
Assignment covenants have not been analyzed by this approach because
there has been only slight recognition that the purpose of some contracts
is to protect trade secrets and only to add assignment as the
appropriate relief to existing trade secret protection."' Courts have recog-
nized the parallelism of the characteristics of trade secrets and protectible
interests in covenants but discuss the problem either as all contract or all
trade secret and not as a trade secret with the relief specified by contract."0
95. See Blake, supra note 80, at 669 n.146.
96. Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Carter Prods., 230 F.2d 855, 865 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 843 (1956) (assignment required of patents on inventions discovered
during former employment); De Long Corp. v. Lucas, 176 F. Supp. 104, 134 (S.D.N.Y.
1959), aff'd, 278 F.2d 804 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 833 (1960) (constructive
trust); Wireless Specialty Apparatus Co. v. Mica Condenser Co., 239 Mass. 158, 166,
131 N.E. 307, 310 (1921).
Most trade secret cases are brought before a postemployment invention has been com-
pleted, and assignment is not necessary. Businesses try to enjoin a threatened disclo3ure
at the earliest possible moment to prevent the information from becoming so widespread
as to make complete relief impossible and to prevent the information from losing its
confidential nature and value. However, in this situation, assignment of patent rights may
be the only manner of re-acquiring the exclusive use of the invention.
97. Courts are accustomed to determining if possible relief will cause hardship be-
fore enforcing contracts providing for specific performance. MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY §
70 (2d ed. 1948). McClintock states that "a common case of hardship which defeats
specific performance of a contract is inability to exercise a trade or calling because of
restrictions imposed by a contract with a former employer." Id. § 70, at 192. Also, if
equity would not grant specific performance, the court could at its discretion impose
the normal remedies for misappropriation of trade secrets. Id. § 70, at 194.
98. It has been recognized that a contract may be "merely declarative of a pre-
existing right." Consolidated Boiler Corp. v. Bogue Elec. Co., 141 N.J. Eq. 550, 566-
67, 58 A.2d 759, 769-70 (Ch. 1948); L. M. Rabinowitz & Co. v. Dasher, 82 N.Y.S.2d
431 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Todd Protectograph Co. v. Hirshberg, 100 Misc. 418, 165 N.Y.
Supp. 906 (Sup. Ct. 1917); Blake, supra note 80, at 669 n.146; Note, 42 COLIUA. L.
Rlv. 317, 318 (1948). However, this has not eliminated the necessity of contractual
tests, and the courts have examined the business interest by the restraint of trade
method to find if it necessitated protection.
99. Several cases have recognized alternative grounds for recovery. Hahn & Clay
v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 212 F. Supp. 22, 31 (S.D. Tex. 1962), aff'd, 320 F.2d 166 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 944 (1963); Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp.
919, 923 (D. Md. 1958); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dempster, 174 Cal. App.
2d 418, 426, 344 P.2d 821, 825 (1959); B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio
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The proposed analysis would clarify which issues are to be treated as con-
tract or tort and would limit the application of the additional contract
considerations and the reasonableness requirements to provisions in contracts
which attempt to expand the employer's rights beyond the limits of trade
secret law.
The third problem occurs when an employer attempts to provide pro-
tection that he feels is necessary, but when a breach occurs, the effect of
enforcement of the provisions of the contract appears unreasonable to the
court. Interpretation and severance are presently used to construe covenants
so that their effect will be reasonable. However, it can be argued that this
method does not rectify the unreasonable effect of these covenants. Most
employees attempt to fulfill their obligations, and therefore most of these
agreements are never breached. Thus, employers impose unreasonable
restrictions upon their employees in the hope that the covenant will not be
litigated. On the other hand, when entire provisions are severed, the em-
ployer often receives less protection from the remaining provisions than he
would have received from the law of trade secrets.' 0
One judicial approach would be to declare totally void and unenforceable
any contract which, on its face, seemed to violate any of the fairness tests.
This approach would use the threat of total invalidity as a sanction against
employers who draft unreasonably broad provisions which, though unen-
forceable if litigated, still have an "in terrorem" effect on employees who
comply with their contracts.'0 '
On the other hand, this approach carries with it the danger of over-
generous treatment of employees. Most inventors are more educated than
the normal industrial employee and may even be in a strong bargaining
position as individuals."'0 The courts' attempt to protect the employee from
overreaching covenants should not prevent them from seeking to determine
what the covenant meant to the parties involved.' If the employee was
App. 493, 192 N.E.2d 99 (1963) ; Roy v. Bolduc, 140 Me. 103, 34 A.2d 479 (1943) ;
Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 17, 105 N.E.2d 685
(C.P. 1952). However, in these cases each action was discussed separately as if they
were unrelated.
100. See Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1934), cert.
denied, 294 U.S. 711 (1935).
101. Blake, supra note 80, at 682.
102. See Blake, supra note 80, at 683.
103. A basic concept of the law of contract is that
within the rather broad limits of public policy . . . the parties can agree to do
anything they wish, and the courts will enforce their agreement according to its
terms. (The "law" of contracts is related primarily to proof-what, if anything,
have they agreed to do, or what can a court piece together out of a jumbled
mass of disconnected data that it can say represents what they agreed to do). W.
Jones, Back to Contract?, 1964 WASH. U.L.Q. 143, 161.
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not forced to sign an agreement which he thought seriously hindered
his future activities, and if what he and his employer understood
the covenant to cover was reasonable, it is hard to see why the entire
contract should be unenforceable on the grounds that it might be ambiguous
enough to have another meaning which the court deems unreasonable.
For instance, in Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, °4 the parties entered into
an agreement providing for assignment by the employee of inventions or
improvements which related to "the subject-matter of his employment."1 '
The court may have carried out the reasonable intentions of the parties by
limiting the meaning of the quoted phrase to inventions and improvements
of winding machines (which was the task in which the employee was
actually engaged)."0'
Admittedly, the line may be difficult to draw because it is sometimes not
easy to tell the difference between interpreting the parties' words to make
them describe a reasonable restriction and rewriting the clause to get a
reasonable result. However, when rewriting is done to prevent voiding the
contract, the employer receives the value of an unfairly broad statement of
the employee's limitations together with enforcement if the court feels that
restriction of the employee's conduct would have been permissible by a
more limited contract.
In most cases, the question will not be close. A restriction "forever" does
not mean "one year or six months," and a "forever" clause should prevent
The restraint of trade tests define the limits of public policy for enforcement of cove-
nants. One purpose of these tests is to assure that the employer is not taking unfair
advantage of the employee, but the shortage of inventive talent and the likelihood that
an inventor is highly educated may decrease the advantage of the employer in obtain-
ing a postemployment covenant. By interpretation and severance, courts may be rec-
ognizing the probability of a good faith agreement and merely attempting to determine
what the parties have agreed to do, even though in some cases the construction process
is carried too far. See Note, 81 L.Q. Rav. 5, 7 (1965).
104. 108 F. Supp. 329 (D. Conn. 1952).
105. Id. at 331.
106. In Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, supra note 104, a covenant requiring as-
signment of all inventions and improvements invented during or within one year fol-
lowing termination of employment and relating to "(1) the subject-matter of his em-
ployment; or (2) any subject matter or problem with respect to which he might become
informed by reason of his employment; or (3) any article manufactured or to be manu-
factured by the plaintiff; or (4) any experimental work carried on by the plaintiff" was
construed to include only inventions peculiar to the very narrow field of winding machine
manufacture. Id. at 331. However, the court only considered the application of phrase
one. It did not consider the possibly unreasonable effect that the other phrases may
have had on the employee. Although the other provisions were not explicitly severed,
the court's analysis of the case amounts to the same result as severance. This may be a
fallacy in the case.
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enforcement of the entire contract."0 7 "Any and all inventions or improve-
ments having in any way any connection with any item manufactured by
the employer" does not mean some limited field of subject matter 0 3 When
it is clear that the clause overreaches the limits of reasonableness, the con-
tract should not be enforced. The only limitation on the court should be that
it not strain to find a possible interpretation which is too restrictive if it is
unlikely that the language was given this meaning by the parties (especially
the employee). Lastly, if the contract is declared void, trade secret protection
should not be eliminated if such protection would have been available in
the absence of the contract.
107. See Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1934),
cert. denied, 294 U.S. 711 (1935). The court did not declare the contract unenforceable
but severed from the contract the clause providing for unlimited duration.
108. See Gas Tool Patents Corp. v. Mould, 133 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1943). The
covenant in issue contained similar language. Although the court did not allow assign-
ment, it did not declare the contract unenforceable, and the covenant was interpreted
to exclude the contested invention. Id. at 818. Therefore, it is unclear whether the
covenant would be enforced in the future if the facts of the case were different.
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